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Introduction 
The preference reversal phenomenon is an iconic empirical puzzle in decision theory.  
Preference reversals have challenged standard economic theory, as well as policy evaluation 
techniques that rely on preference elicitation.1  Preference reversals are defined as 
inconsistent preference rankings for two lotteries in terms of choice and price; subjects 
choose a low-payoff, high-probability lottery (p-bet), but place a higher minimum willing to 
sell price on a high-payoff, low-probability lottery ($-bet).  Some researchers have proposed 
explanations of why preference reversals occur, and others have developed new preference 
theories to accommodate preference reversals.2   
We test whether pre-play learning significantly increases the  proportion of subjects  
who consistently indicate a preference between  two lotteries, whether they are asked to 
make a choice or indicate a minimum willingness to sell price.  Pre-play learning is ex-ante 
lottery learning, where subjects observe a series of lotteries actually played out before making 
decisions.  In the absence of pre-play learning, subjects may overweight  the small 
probability of a negative  lottery payoff in the p-bet (Fehr-Duba and Epper 2012).  
However, pre-play learning may help subjects more appropriately weight possible outcomes  
by demonstrating the frequencies of realized lottery outcomes.  This change may make 
selling prices for the p-bet, for subjects who choose the p-bet, higher than their selling prices 
for the $-bet and thus make subjects’ preference rankings consistent in choice and price.   
The preference reversal phenomenon has been conjectured to be a product of 
                                           
1 For comprehensive reviews on the preference reversals, see Seidle (2002) and Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006). 
2 For example, Cubitt, Munro and Starmer (2004) tested several explanations of preference reversals.  
Schmidt, Starmer and Sugden (2008) and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012) have developed new 
preference theories to accommodate the preference reversals.   
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“limited awareness about the immediate environment or the possible longer-run 
consequences of any acts that might be taken” (p.226) in Plott’s (1996) preference discovery 
hypothesis.  Plott hypothesized that learning about one’s own preferences and decision 
environments through “repeated choices, practice, incentives (feedback)” and “sobering and 
refocusing experiences” (p.227) allows one to reach rational choices and avoid preference 
reversals.  Braga and Starmer (2005) reviewed empirical works on the preference reversal 
phenomenon and speculated that learning one’s own preferences and decision environments 
could remove preference reversals.  In our experiment, pre-play learning may help subjects 
learn their own preferences and learn more about objective probabilities.  Subjects may 
learn their own preferences by experiencing realized lottery outcomes.  Subjects may also 
improve their understanding of objective probabilities and behave as if they update their 
subjective probabilities. 
To explain our experimental design, we add pre-play learning to a typical preference-
reversal experimental design in the economics literature.  We adopt Grether and Plott’s 
(1979) experimental design. Their experiment carefully controlled for potential concerns in 
other researchers’ previous preference-reversal experiments, such as the absence of monetary 
incentives and subjects’ confusion and misunderstanding of experimental procedures. 
Moreover, their experiment became the prototype for subsequent studies.  
In our experiment, we find that pre-play learning makes the average selling price for 
the p-bet, among subjects who choose the p-bet, higher than their average selling price for the 
$-bet, suggesting that pre-play learning makes subjects’ preference rankings consistent in 
choice and price at the group level.  This result can be explained by the convergence of 
probability weighting functions toward linearity (Hau et al. 2008; Erev et al. 2010).  In the 
absence of pre-play learning, subjects may overweight a small probability of receiving a 
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negative lottery payoff in the p-bet, which may lead them to price the p-bet lower than the $-
bet However, pre-play learning may reduce the overweighting of the small probability of 
losing in the p-bet, which may lead subjects to increase their selling prices for the p-bet.  
Thus, pre-play learning may increase the frequency that subjects’ indicate preference 
rankings that are consistent in choice and price. 
Researchers have tested lottery feedback in the preference reversal literature (Cox 
and Grether, 1996).  Lottery feedback is different from pre-play learning.  Lottery feedback 
denotes ex-post lottery learning, where lotteries are played each round after subjects have 
made decisions in that round.  Braga, Humphrey and Starmer (2009) find that lottery 
feedback is problematic because it makes subjects’ selling prices for the $-bet, for subjects 
who choose the $ bet, lower than their prices for the p-bet. They may be more sensitive to the 
realization of a negative lottery payoff of the $-bet when they own the bet.  Thus, lottery 
feedback may not make subjects’ preference rankings consistent in choice and price.  
However, we do not find such evidence for pre-play learning in our experiment. 
Experiment 
We recruited 77 subjects via email invitation on a university campus in 2015.  All sessions 
were conducted in a lab with paper and pencil and lasted 30 minutes.  Each subject was 
randomly assigned to either a pre-play learning group (n=42) or a control group (n=35).  
Decision tasks were identical in these two groups, except for the availability of pre-play 
learning.  Subjects were asked to make decisions in one choice task and two pricing tasks.  
In the choice task, subjects chose between two lotteries.  The two lotteries were a low-
payoff, high-probability lottery with a 35/36 chance of winning $4 and a 1/36 chance of 
losing $1 (Expected value=$3.86), and a high-payoff, low-probability lottery with an 11/36 
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chance of winning $16 and a 25/36 chance of losing $1.50 (Expected value=$3.85).  We call 
these lotteries a p-bet and a $-bet, respectively.  In the pricing tasks, subjects decided 
whether they would sell a lottery at given prices.  21 prices were displayed in decreasing 
order in $.50 decrements between $9.99 and $0.  This kind of pricing task has been used in 
other studies (e.g., Butler and Loomes 2007; Loomes, Starmer and Sugden 2010).  We 
controlled for possible order effects by switching the order of tasks: (pricing tasks) then 
(choice task) and (choice task) then (pricing tasks).   
At the end of each experiment, subjects earned a show-up fee of $10 and the 
additional earnings (or losses) from their decisions in a randomly-selected task.  The task 
was selected by drawing a ball from a bingo cage containing three balls: one for the lottery 
choice task, one for pricing the p-bet, and one for pricing the #-bet.  If a lottery choice task 
was selected, the lottery that subjects had chosen was played, and its outcome was paid.  If a 
pricing task was selected, one price was randomly drawn by drawing a ball from a bingo cage 
containing 21 balls, and subjects were paid according to their stated prices.  If a subject had 
decided to sell the lottery at that price, the subject received that price.  Otherwise, the lottery 
was played and payment was determined by the lottery outcome.  A bingo cage containing 
36 balls was used to determine lottery outcomes.  We followed Grether and Plott’s (1979) 
experimental instructions to the extent possible.  Our experimental instructions are available 
in the appendix. 
Pre-play learning was conducted only for the pre-play learning group.  We played 
lotteries ten times each by drawing a ball from a bingo cage that contained 36 balls (with 
replacement each time) before subjects made any decisions in choice and pricing tasks. Half 
of the subjects saw the p-bet first and half of the subjects saw the $-bet first. During this 
demonstration, subjects kept a record of the drawn numbers and circled the corresponding 
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lottery outcomes on decision sheets.  
In analyzing our experimental data, if a subject indicated a willingness to sell a 
lottery for $X but not for $X-$0.50, we used the midpoint ($X-$0.25) as the subject’s lowest 
named selling price.  In lottery-pricing tasks, there were nine subjects who indicated more 
than one switching point or who indicated unusual choices consisting of keeping a lottery at 
high prices and selling it at low prices.  We included responses of those subjects in our 
analysis by using a first switching point in the case of multiple switching points, and using a 
maximum price of $9.99 in the case of the unusual choice pattern.3   
Results 
Figure 1 reports the average minimum willingness to sell prices for lotteries by subjects’ 
lottery choices.  In the fifth and the sixth bars (without pre-play learning), subjects choosing 
the p-bet assign similar minimum willingness to sell prices to the p-bet ($3.94) and the $-bet 
($4.26).  These two values are not significantly different in a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (p-value: 0.47).  In contrast, in the first two bars (with pre-play learning), subjects 
choosing the p-bet assign higher selling prices to the p-bet ($5.16) than to the $-bet ($4.41).  
These two values are significantly different in the same test (p-value: 0.03).  With and 
without pre-play learning, subjects choosing the $-bet consistently assign higher selling 
prices to the $-bet (p-value<0.05 in the both cases using the same test).  These results show 
that pre-play learning makes the preference rankings of subjects choosing the p-bet consistent 
in terms of choice and price at the group level.  
We compare subjects’ preference rankings for two lotteries in terms of choice and 
                                           
3 Excluding the responses of the nine subjects does not change the general findings in our subsequent analyses.   
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price at the individual level.  Two types of preference reversals are possible.  One is the 
standard reversal: a subject who chooses the p-bet values the $-bet higher than the p-bet.  
The other is the non-standard reversal: a subject who chooses the $-bet values the p-bet 
higher than the $-bet.  The rate of standard reversals among subjects who choose the p-bet is 
typically greater than the rate of non-standard reversals among subjects who choose the $-bet.  
Previous studies focused on whether this asymmetric pattern is removed by a particular 
method. Preference reversals can be viewed as subjects’ decision errors and no longer 
challenge standard economic theory if the rates of standard and non-standard reversals are the 
same.   
In the right half of table 1 (without pre-play learning), the rate of standard reversals is 
56%:  7 out of 16 subjects who chose the p-bet valued the $-bet higher than the p-bet.  The 
rate of non-standard reversals is 27%: 2 of 14 subjects who chose the $-bet valued the p-bet 
higher than the $-bet.  These two rates are different in a two-sided sign test (p-value: 0.07), 
which suggests that subjects’ preference rankings for lotteries are different in choice and price 
at the individual level, in the absence of pre-play learning.  In the right half of the table 
(with pre-play learning), the rates of standard and non-standard reversals are 27% and 10%, 
respectively.  These two rates are still significantly different (p-value: 0.07), which suggests 
that pre-play learning is not strong enough to equalize the rates of standard and non-standard 
reversals.  Note, however, that pre-play learning decreased the rate of standard reversals by 
half, from 56% to 27%, which suggests that pre-play learning makes subjects’ preference 
rankings more consistent at the individual level than choices without pre-play learning.  
Also, note that pre-play learning does not seem to increase the rate of non-standard reversals.  
The rate of non-standard reversals is 14% without pre-play learning and 10% with pre-play 
learning.  In contrast, Braga, Humphrey and Starmer (2009) found that lottery feedback 
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increased the rate of non-standard reversals.  In this sense, pre-play learning has a more 
pronounced effect on preference reversals than lottery feedback.   
Discussion 
Our results can be explained by the psychology of “tail events”–rare, high-impact events–
discussed in Barberis (2013).  In the absence of pre-play learning, subjects tend to 
overweight the probability of tail events (Fehr-Duba and Epper, 2012).  That is, subjects 
may overweight the probability (i.e. 0.03) of receiving the negative lottery payoff of the p-bet 
when they value the bet.  However, pre-play learning may help subjects balance their 
attention across lottery outcomes in the p-bet and reduce their overweight of the tail event in 
the p-bet.  This line of explanation is empirically supported by Hau et al. (2008) and Erev et 
al. (2010).  These authors found that probability weight functions converged toward 
linearity when subjects observed playing lotteries multiple times before making decisions.  
Moreover, this line of explanation seems likely because the majority of people have non-
linear probability weight functions in the absence of pre-play learning.  Bruhin, Fehr-Duda 
and Epper (2010) found that, without pre-play learning, about 80% of subjects exhibited non-
linear probability weight functions, while the remainder exhibited linear probability weight 
functions. 
Pre-play learning does not change subjects’ selling prices for the $-bet, probably 
because subjects do not overweight the probability (i.e. 0.31) of winning a positive lottery 
payoff in the $-bet, even in the absence of pre-play learning.  This conjecture is supported 
by typical probability weight functions reviewed in Fehr-Duba and Epper (2012); the 
probability weight functions are close to the objective probability in the range between 0.3 
and 0.4.  Hau et al. (2008) and Erev et al. (2010) found that the observation of playing 
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lotteries had little impact on subjects’ probability weight functions in the range between 0.3 
and 0.4.  We expect that pre-play learning would equalize the rates of standard and non-
standard reversals if we used another $-bet with a smaller probability of winning a positive 
lottery payoff than the current one (i.e. 0.31). Subjects are likely to overweight a probability 
of winning a positive lottery payoff that is smaller than 0.3 in the absence of pre-play 
learning.  We expect that pre-play learning would decrease subjects’ selling prices for the 
new $-bet and thus decrease the ratio of standard reversals further than in the current result.  
We leave this hypothesis for the future research.  
Our results bring researchers’ attention to a cause of preference reversals that has 
been relatively little considered in the literature.  The overpricing of the $-bet has been 
considered the main cause for preference reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006).  That is, 
when subjects value a bet, their valuation is anchored at the higher lottery payoff of the bet.  
Subjects adjust their valuation downward from the higher lottery payoff based on the 
probability of winning.  If the downward adjustment is insufficient for the $-bet, the $-bet 
would be overpriced.  This anchoring-and-insufficient-adjustment explanation is not 
consistent with our result that the overweight of a small probability of not receiving a positive 
lottery payoff in the p-bet may result in the preference reversals.  Thus, our results provide a 
new insight into the preference reversal literature. 
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Figure 1 Subjects’ average selling prices for bets by choice 
 
Notes: P-values are reported from two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the equality of 
selling prices for the p-bet and the $-bet.  ***: P-value<0.01, **:<0.05.  The numbers of 
subjects are in the parentheses.  Subjects who chose an indifferent option between the p-bet 
and the $-bet are omitted. 
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Table 1 Subjects’ preference rankings for bets in terms of choice and price 
 With pre-play learning (n=42) Without pre-play learning (n=35) 
 Selling price 
for p-bet 
> Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Selling price 
for p-bet 
< Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Selling price 
for p-bet 
= Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Rate of 
inconsistent 
preference 
rankings 
Selling price 
for p-bet 
> Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Selling price 
for p-bet 
< Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Selling price 
for p-bet 
= Selling 
price for $-
bet 
Rate of 
inconsistent 
preference 
rankings 
Chose p-bet 19 7 4 0.27 7 9 4 0.56 
Chose $-bet 1 9 1 0.10 2 12 - 0.14 
Indifferent - 1 - - - 1 - - 
P-value  0.07  0.07 
Note: P-values are reported from a sign test of the null hypothesis that standard and non-standard reversals are equally likely. 
